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## THESIS

NAVAL RESERVE : AN ORGANIZATION IN TRANSITION

by

Richard C. Mazza

September 1992

Thesis Advisor:

Richard B. Doyle

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by

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Lieutenant Commander, United States Naval Reserve  
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Submitted in partial fulfillment  
of the requirements for the degree of


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
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## ABSTRACT

The purpose of this thesis is to examine the issues facing the Naval Reserve as it transitions from its cold war mission to new and, possibly, expanded roles under the New National Military Strategy. The thesis further provides an overview of the changed strategic environment and budgetary concerns that serve as drivers for change within the Naval Reserve. The evolution of the present Naval Reserve organization, manpower and mobilization issues, and the opportunity for organizational reform are also addressed. Additionally, an overview is provided of proposals and directives for expanded reserve participation under the Innovative Naval Reserve Concept. Lastly, conclusions and recommendations are made for facilitation of the ongoing transition.

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## I. INTRODUCTION

### A. BACKGROUND

With the collapse of the Soviet Union, the United States finds itself, for the first time since World War II, without an immediately identifiable military threat to national security. The extent and speed of change in the international system was unimaginable even a few years ago. To the extent that good public policy requires thoughtful planning, the unanticipated changes have generated an acknowledged requirement for reevaluation of national priorities, particularly the size and structure of the armed forces. This requirement takes on further importance when taken in the context of the budget debate.

In recognition of the decreased threat and the tighter budgetary climate, the Department of Defense (DOD) has proposed budgets which recognize the need for a smaller active force. Included in these budgets have been proposals for a proportional reduction in the size and structure of the reserve force. Although Congress has expressed enthusiasm for reduction of the active force, they have opposed significant cuts in the size and structure of the reserve force.

A statement made by General Colin Powell, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS), in congressional budgetary

testimony is indicative of the breadth of disagreement between the DOD and the Congress over the reserve issue. When asked about the consequences of not cutting the reserve force to a level envisioned under DOD's proposed Base Force Concept, Powell responded, "...we would badly imbalance the force. We would be retaining reserve component structure and capability that is not needed." (Powell, 1992)

One difficulty in coming to a consensus on the most efficient force structure is in the area of determining likely scenarios in which the armed forces will be used and the active/reserve force mix required to effectively carry out the anticipated missions. DOD has outlined its understanding of post-Cold War military requirements in the Base Force Concept.

In an attempt to understand the effects of any significant changes in the force structure, Congress recently has mandated that DOD conduct an independent assessment of the structure and mix of active and reserve forces. This mandate requires the Secretary of Defense to "...submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives a report containing an assessment of a wide range of alternatives relating to the structure and mix of active and reserve forces appropriate for carrying out assigned missions in the mid-to-late-1990s." (U.S. House of Representatives, 1991)

In addition to this congressional mandate, the Navy is currently reviewing the reserve issue on several fronts. The

Naval Reserve Project at the Center for Naval Warfare Studies at the Naval War College has developed the Innovative Naval Reserve Concept to address the realities of force reduction and changing mission requirements.

Recommendations made to and mandated by Congress along with the Navy's own reevaluation of the reserves will inevitably result in a requirement to substantially modify current reserve force command and administrative structure. This anticipated requirement along with the experience of reserve participation in Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm provide an excellent starting point for analysis of the existing structure. In particular, a need exists for an examination of the manpower distribution of Naval Reserve reinforcing and sustaining (augment) units along with an appraisal of their organizational effectiveness.

## **B. OBJECTIVES**

The objective of this thesis is to examine the effectiveness of Naval Reserve augment units in meeting the manpower requirements of the active forces. Given that the organizational efficiency of the reserves and manpower requirements of the active forces were exercised during Operation Desert Storm, lessons learned from that experience will be compared to organizational assumptions which existed prior to the call up.

### **C. THE RESEARCH QUESTION**

The primary research question of this thesis is, "Are the present manpower requirements and organizational assumptions regarding Naval Reserve augment units still valid?"

Additional issues to be addressed include:

- Discussion of the manpower distribution of the Naval reserve between commissioned units and augment units
- Discussion of the geopolitical assumptions of the Base Force Concept and how they differ from the Cold War assumptions of the Total Force era
- Analysis of the organizational structure of the Naval reserve
- Analysis of the criteria for determining mobilization manpower and training requirements
- Examination of management review findings and consideration of lessons learned from Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm
- Recommendations for changes in Naval Reserve force mission and organization

### **D. SCOPE**

The focus of this thesis will be on the rationale and assumptions behind the billet structure and administration of augment units and how they compare to actual mobilization requirements and anticipated changes in mission requirements. Many of the total wartime manpower requirements for the active forces are identified in the augment units. Unlike commissioned reserve hardware units, such as Reserve Force Squadrons (RESFORONS) and Reserve Force Ships, augment units

are assigned to meet the wartime manpower requirements of active duty commands during mobilization. As can be seen from the distribution figures in Table 1-1, augment units account for 88 percent of Selected Naval Reserve manpower.

Table 1-1 NAVAL RESERVE MANPOWER DISTRIBUTION

NAVAL RESERVE MANPOWER DISTRIBUTION		
HARDWARE AFLOAT	HARDWARE AIR	TOTAL HARDWARE
2,631	7,944	10,575
AUGMENT FLEET	AUGMENT SHORE	TOTAL AUGMENT
26,982	49,529	76,511

TOTAL 87,086

Source: RTSS/RHS

## E. METHODOLOGY

This thesis is based on an examination of Department of Defense studies and policy statements, Center for Naval Analysis studies, Center for Naval Warfare Studies proposals, papers, and historical research, Department of the Navy studies, internal documents, inspection and audit reports, and instructions, and personal interviews. The dynamic nature of the current debate about the future of the reserves in general has made many existing instructions, policies, and funding assumptions tenuous at best as there now exist almost as many

recommendations, studies, and opinions as there are questions as to the future of the reserves. Although a proliferation of analysis on the reserve issue exists, a commonality of themes emerged in this analysis. Many of these themes are age old and predate the historic and economic circumstances driving the current debate. Among these themes are:

- The historical dichotomous relationship between the Selected Reserves and Reserve force headquarters.
- Historical misconceptions and poor communication between Gaining Commands, Selected Reserves, and Reserve force headquarters.
- The proliferation of "stove pipe" commands within the Naval Reserve with a resultant administrative duplication and blurring of the chain of command.
- The chronic difficulty in reconciling mobilization training requirements with a reasonable means of effectively measuring readiness.

(CINCPACFLTDET420, 1988)

Many of these issues have for years been the topic of debate within the Navy and, especially, the reserve community. Because, in recent years, the reserves have been particularly productive, especially in the areas of contributory support, there existed little incentive to take on these particularly complicated issues. With the shrinking of the total defense budget and the mandate to redefine and possibly expand the role of the reserves, there now exists a constructive climate to address these issues.

Obviously conclusive results from this type of analysis are difficult to establish, especially since the Congress has

yet to determine the levels for reserve funding, and the Navy has yet to complete its own analysis.

#### **F. DEFINITIONS AND ABBREVIATIONS**

The following list of acronyms and abbreviations is provided in the interests of clarification.

Navy Manpower Data Accounting System (NMDAS) - Operated by OP-01, NMDAS contains inputs from resource sponsors and manpower claimants to determine active duty and reserve unit billet structures.

Navy Manpower Mobilization System (NAMOS) - Initiated in 1978 and brought on line in 1983, NAMOS uses information in the Ship, Shore, and Squadron Manpower Documents to determine mobilization manpower requirements. (KOSTIUK, 1988)

Reserve Force Squadron (RESFORON) - Reserve force aircraft squadrons, RESFORONS are the functional equivalent of active duty aviation squadrons except that they are manned by active duty TARs and selected reservists.

Reserve Headquarters Support (RHS) - RHS is an automated training and manpower tracking system used in the day to day management of the Naval Reserve force. This system was formerly known as Reserve Training Support System (RTSS).

Reserve Unit Assignment Document (RUAD) - This document, generated by RTSS, lists reserve unit billet structure, billet mobilization description and individual readiness calculations.

Selected Reserve (SELRES) - Personnel assigned to Selected Reserve units, SELRES are reservists in training programs, individual mobilization augmentees, and full time support personnel. (Department of Defense, 1990)

Ship Manpower Document (SMD) - Started in 1966, the SMD is designed to determine the minimum number and quality of positions needed on board ship in a wartime environment at sea.

Shore Manpower Document (SHMD) - The SHMD applies industrial engineering and management analysis techniques to determine and document shore-manpower requirements. Unlike the SMD and SQMD program, the SHMD program is used solely for determining peacetime personnel requirements. The NAMOS system uses the SHMD results and adjusts them for expected workload changes to get an estimate of mobilization requirements.

Squadron Manpower Document (SQMD) - The SQMD is designed to determine the minimum number and quality of positions needed on board a squadron during wartime. (Kostiuk, 1988)

Training and Administration of Reserves (TARs) - TARs are active duty reserve personnel who specialize in full time reserve support.

## **G. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY**

The thesis is divided into seven chapters as follows:

Chapter I: INTRODUCTION



## **Chapter II: BACKGROUND, LITERATURE REVIEW**

This chapter describes the current and historical circumstances driving the debate regarding the role and structure of the reserve force. The roles of the reserves under the Total Force Concept and under the proposed Base Force Concept are discussed. Other studies and initiatives regarding the reserve forces are also examined. Finally the political implications of the budget process and the role of the Congress, independent of DOD concerns, are examined.

## **Chapter III: RESERVE FORCE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE**

This chapter discusses the various Naval Reserve command structures as they have evolved since the end of World War II. The consolidation of the Naval Reserve force and the present structure is examined, with particular emphasis on the organization of augment units under the Gaining Command Concept.

## **Chapter IV: RESERVE MANPOWER AND MOBILIZATION REQUIREMENTS**

This chapter examines the rationale and methodology used to determine manpower and individual training requirements for mobilization.

## **Chapter V: ANALYSIS**

This chapter looks at conflicting issues within the areas of management, organization, ADP infrastructure, manpower, and training in the management of Naval Reserve augment units. Additionally, the experience and lessons learned from Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm are compared to pre-existing mobilization assumptions.

#### **Chapter VI: THE INNOVATIVE NAVAL RESERVE**

This chapter examines the current proposals for changing the mission of the Naval Reserve. Specific recommendations from the Innovative Naval Reserve Concept which have been adopted or rejected are discussed.

#### **Chapter VII: CONCLUSIONS, RECOMMENDATIONS**

This chapter presents conclusions drawn from the findings and analysis presented, and makes specific recommendations for organizational change within the Naval Reserve.

#### **H. SUMMARY OF FINDINGS**

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the realignment of national priorities has provided for a complete reevaluation of the size and structure of the armed forces. The present Naval Reserve force, particularly the gaining command concept, is built on a total mobilization for global war concept which is no longer applicable. As outlined by the Innovative Naval Reserve Concept, the present organizational structure of the

Naval Reserve is in need of reform to reflect the anticipated future roles of the reserve force. The exact nature of the reserve/active mix will largely be a function of the reserve force that DOD and Congress are developing. The new reserve organizational structure and redefinition of reserve missions may be larger than the force recommended by DOD as a result of congressional policy directives.

## II. BACKGROUND, LITERATURE REVIEW

### A. BACKGROUND

The size of the active duty military has largely been a function of the perceived external threat to national security as well as occasional expeditionary requirements when deemed appropriate to the national interest. Manpower requirements for the active force have been met in a number of ways, from conscription (when necessary) to the present-day All-Volunteer Force.

Throughout the history of our Republic, reserve forces have been an essential element in the composition of the armed forces. The existence of reserve forces, their close identification with specific localities and, in some cases, individual personalities, have served to make the reserve forces a measurable ingredient of the social and economic fabric of the country. As described by Goldich, "American military reserve policies and the attitudes that led to them are outgrowths of England's military tradition of manning its armies with contingents raised locally and commanded by the local nobility or gentry." (Wilson, 1985 pg.9)

When historians speak of the great battles of the American Civil War, specific actions are nearly always portrayed in terms of the distinctive volunteer units involved. Typical

examples are the historical accounts of the battle of Gettysburg. In that battle, the critical engagement was at Little Round Top on the Union left. Rather than a decisive skirmish of Union troops engaging Confederate troops, historians describe the battle in terms of the heroic actions of the 20th Volunteers of Maine, led by Professor (Colonel) Joshua L. Chamberlain, against the 4th, 15th, and 47th Volunteers of Alabama. (McPherson, 1988) This and countless other illustrations of the traditional concept of "citizen soldier" are often overlooked by the professional military establishment in understanding the historical role and social significance of the non-professional military in our society.

#### **B. STRATEGIC CONCERNS**

The fundamental strategic assumption behind the present structure of the reserve force, global war against the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies, has dominated military manpower planning since the end of World War II. The present strategic situation is profoundly different from that of just one year ago. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact was so rapid that defense planners have scarcely been able to keep up with the pace of changes in the international system.

As characterized by CJCS General Colin Powell: "Future threats to U.S. interests are inherent in the uncertainty and instability of a rapidly changing world." (Joint Chiefs of

Staff, 1992) Typical of the possible future scenarios was the largely unforeseen conflict with Iraq in Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm.

Although the reserves have been used sparingly since World War II, the recent experience of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm illustrates the regional conflict scenario outlined in DOD's Base Force Concept, as well as the feasibility and increased political acceptability of using the reserves in future conflicts. (Downey, 1991)

### **C. TOTAL FORCE POLICY**

Initiated in 1970 by Secretary of Defense Melvin Laird, the Total Force Concept was introduced to address the economic and political necessity to streamline the military following the end of the Vietnam war. As outlined by Gotz and Brown, the Total Force Concept

"....stipulated that all elements of the active force structure--including not only active and reserve components, but also civil servants in the DOD, civilian contractors, and retired military personnel--should be considered concurrently in developing military capability in support of national military objectives. In essence, the total force policy states that missions should be given to whichever component can achieve them most economically. The intent of the policy is to make better use of the reserve components and to save money by shifting some of the functions formerly performed solely by active units to the reserves and other personnel." (Gotz and Brown, 1991)

The Total Force Concept also corresponded with the Nixon Doctrine which attempted to redefine the exercise of American power through increased diplomatic involvement and direct military participation by treaty allies and regional powers. (Kissinger, 1979)

From the manpower perspective, a significant element of the Total Force Concept was the eventual replacement of the draft with the all-volunteer force, and the stated intent to use reserve manpower as an "initial and primary source of augmentation of the active forces in any future emergency requiring a rapid and substantial expansion of the active forces." (Laird, 1970, pp. 1-2)

Although the Total Force Concept was officially embraced by the Navy, Cronin points out in the following analysis of the Total Force that an apparent contradiction existed between acknowledgement of Total Force and the active reductions of the Naval Reserve during the early to mid 1970's. The period of demobilization and retrenchment that characterized the decade of the 70's forced the Navy to recommend policy that was seemingly at odds with the concept of increased reserve participation under the Total Force. In its budget requests in the 1970's, the Navy consistently requested smaller reductions in active duty manpower billets and increased reductions in reserve manpower billets.

Under increasing skepticism and apprehension from Congress and reserve advocacy groups, the Navy rationalized its

proposals for a smaller Naval Reserve force. The Navy argued that in an era of rapid ship demobilization and replacement with fewer but larger and more sophisticated ships requiring larger crews, steeper reductions in active duty manpower requirements were not justified. If the smaller fleet was to maintain the commitments to forward deployment then it would be difficult to identify missions to shift to the reserve force. The strategic thinking at that time also envisioned a quick and decisive war with the Soviet Union which would not last long enough for Naval Reserve participation to be of significant value.

Additionally, the all-volunteer force necessitated increased expenditures on educational and bonus incentives to recruit and retain even a minimum number of required reservists. Rather than shifting funds from procurement and operating budgets from the active side, logic dictated consolidating the existing reserve force and, therefore, spending more money on the same number of reservists. In summary, the decade of the 70's was a time in which the "one Navy" concept implied under the Total Force did not take place. (Cronin, 1987)

In 1980, with the incoming Reagan administration, there came a mandate to modernize and expand the size of the active forces. As articulated by the newly appointed Secretary of the Navy (and Naval reservist), John Lehman, the administration became committed to the establishment of a 600



ship Navy. A new "maritime strategy," designed to carry the war to the enemy, required effective utilization of all components of the Navy, especially the reserves.

During the buildup, manpower planning took on special significance as the Naval Reserve was not able to meet all of its manpower requirements. It was during this time that the Naval Reserve became increasingly involved with "mutual support." The idea of mutual support was to integrate reserve training with direct support to the fleet. Through creative concepts such as Weekend Away Training (WET/IDTT), reservists were to get hands-on training with active units or skill utilization similar to their mobilization requirements. (Cronin, 1987)

In some cases, such as the Naval Reserve Intelligence Command, a substantial portion of fleet intelligence production and direct intelligence support has for years been increasingly provided by Naval reservists and has served as the model for direct support and horizontal integration with the active forces.

#### **D. THE NEW NATIONAL MILITARY STRATEGY/BASE FORCE**

As mandated by the Goldwater-Nichols Reorganization Act of 1986, to provide assistance to the President's *National Security Strategy* and *Defense Planning Guidance* for the Secretary of Defense, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has developed the New National Military Strategy (NNMS).

The NNMS acknowledges the realities of the changed world order brought on by the collapse of the Soviet Union and calls for a refocusing of defense policy and force structure. Under this strategy, the following assumptions are made:

- The world is still a dangerous place despite the disintegration of the Soviet Union.
- There exists a high degree of uncertainty as to the ultimate reconstitution of the former Soviet Union and the consequences of dealing with a multi-polar vice bipolar political environment.
- The United States, by necessity, must still remain a major participant in world affairs.
- Declining budgets for the military are a political and economic reality. (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1992)

#### **1. THE BASE FORCE**

The NNMS requires that the U.S. retain the ability to act unilaterally, if necessary, to promote stated U.S. interests. To that end, the military structure required to maintain that capability is outlined under the Base Force Concept. Although not a force organizational structure, the Base Force envisions four conceptual force packages and four support functions to carry out the NNMS. As outlined in the NNMS, the four operational force packages include:

- Strategic Forces
- Pacific Forces
- Atlantic Forces
- Contingency Forces

The four identified supporting capabilities include:

- Transportation
- Space
- Reconstitution
- Research and Development (Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1992)

## **2. FOUNDATIONS**

As outlined by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the fundamental strategic premise of the NNMS is that the U.S. must retain the ability to detect and respond to the challenges of the future.

### ***a. Strategic Deterrence and Defense***

The continued existence of thousands of nuclear weapons and the uncertain nature of their command, control and possible proliferation necessitate the capability of the U.S. to maintain adequate detection and deterrent capabilities.

### ***b. Forward Presence***

Commitment and credibility to our allies along with the enhancement of regional stability require a forward deployed force to protect our security interests.

### ***c. Crisis Response***

The capability to maintain a credible force to respond rapidly to regional crises is necessary to execute the NNMS. The bi-polar nature of the international system suggests that

a regional crises and short notice military contingencies capability must be preserved.

**d. Reconstitution**

The capability to regenerate credible new fighting forces is an essential element in forestalling any potential military adversary from competing militarily with the U.S. This includes drawing on cadre-type units, military assets, mobilizing previously trained or new manpower, and activating the industrial base on a large scale.

(Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1992)

**E. CONGRESSIONAL/BUDGET CONCERNS**

There remains, however, disagreement between the DOD and reserve advocates in Congress as to what reserve/active mix will be funded by the Congress to most effectively meet these new mission requirements. The military manpower end strength authorizations and appropriations for fiscal year (FY) 1992 shown in table 2-1 illustrate the disagreement between the DOD and Congress.

For fiscal year 1992, Congress approved the President's active end strength request which included significant reductions for the active force but added back approximately 67,000 more reserve billets than requested. The DOD has complained that as Congress adds back reserve billets, the resultant change in the active/reserve ratio in end strength unnecessarily complicates the defense planning process. In an

attempt to moderate the conflict on this issue, a congressionally-mandated study is to make recommendations on the consequences of a variety of active/reserve force mix options. Under the congressional mandate, the National Defense Research Institute (NDRI), a federally funded research

TABLE 2-1 FY 1992 DOD MANPOWER REQUESTS/AND CONGRESSIONAL ACTIONS

END STRENGTH AUTHORIZATIONS				
REQUEST		HOUSE	SENATE	CONFERENCE
GUARD/ RESERVE	1,068,400	1,135,876	1,140,760	1,135,896
ACTIVE	1,886,400	1,886,400	1,886,400	1,886,400
END STRENGTH APPROPRIATIONS				
REQUEST		HOUSE	SENATE	CONFERENCE
GUARD/ RESERVE	1,068,400	1,176,991	1,140,760	1,119,547
ACTIVE	1,886,400	1,886,400	1,886,400	1,886,400

Sources: 102d Congress 1st Session House Report 102-95

102d Congress 1st Session Senate Report 102-154

and development center (FFRDC) operated by the RAND corporation, has been selected to conduct the study. The interim report of this study, published in May 1992, contains a brief review of the need for the assessment and a detailed description of the methodology to be used. (Rand, 1992) The final report is due in December 1992.

The central issue in the debate between Congress and the DOD involves the trade offs between reserve funding and the credibility of the Base Force. As articulated by Secretary of Defense Dick Cheney:

"If we cannot cut the reserve component, then we end up having to cut down the active force even more. ... We end up having to cut on operations and maintenance, and that affects training, and that affects readiness. ... We end up having to reduce modernization, our procurement... to maintain the kind of quality infrastructure essential with respect to a quality force." (DOD, 1992)

#### **F. REVIEW OF RELATED LITERATURE**

Writings and studies of the past decade about the Naval Reserve have concentrated almost exclusively on management, manpower supply, retention, recruiting, readiness, and compensation issues concerning the already existing reserve force. (Curran, 1983; Curran and Quester, 1983; Feldman, 1985; Goldberg, 1985; Tyron, 1985; Domabyl, 1987; Hall, 1987; Kostiuik and Grogan, 1987; Shiells and Fletcher, 1987; Kostiuik,

Follmann and Shiells, 1988). Much of this analysis concentrates on econometric analysis and statistical summaries and their policy implications. It is important to note that these studies pre-date the significant historical events and changed economic circumstances of the last few years. They are, therefore, somewhat extraneous to the present debate.

An examination of the current literature, including Department of Defense proposals and policy statements, Center for Naval Warfare Studies proposals, papers, internal documents, instructions, inspection and audit reports, and personal interviews, reveals the dynamic nature of the current debate about the future of the reserves. In general, these new proposals imply that many existing instructions, policy, and funding assumptions are tenuous at best, as there now exist almost as many recommendations and opinions as there are questions about the future of the reserves. Ironically, the Navy now faces the prospect of cutting back both active and reserve manpower with no long-range plans or policy to effectively execute the drawdown.

### **III. RESERVE FORCE ORGANIZATIONAL STRUCTURE**

#### **A. BACKGROUND**

The Naval Reserve has origins in the various state naval militias which only came under full control of the Navy with the Navy Militia Act of 1914. These state naval militias have roots dating back to the colonial period. In some cases, New York State, for example, the state naval militia still exists. (Chaloupka et al., U.S. Naval Reserve History)

#### **B. POST WORLD WAR II ERA**

The present day organizational structure of the Naval Reserve has its origin in the reestablishment of a Naval Reserve organization following the Second World War. Under this reorganization, the Naval Air Reserve Training Command was established in Glenview, Illinois in 1946. In 1956, the Naval Reserve Training Command (non-aviation) was established in Omaha, Nebraska. (Chaloupka et al., U.S. Naval Reserve History)

##### **1. Naval Reserve (non-aviation)**

The Naval Reserve Training Command encompassed non-aviation units including surface and submarine reserve units.

##### **a. Organization**

The primary responsibility for the training and administration of the non-aviation Naval Reserve rested with



the Commandants of the now defunct Naval Districts. Naval Districts exercised administrative control over all Naval activities within their particular geographic area of responsibility. Although formal responsibility rested with the District Commandant himself, the District Deputy Chief of Staff for Reserves for that particular district was the primary administrative authority for reserve affairs within that district. The District Commandant reported directly to the Director of the Naval Reserve/ACNO-NR (Assistant Chief of Naval Operations (Naval Reserve)). Following the establishment of the Naval Reserve Training Command in 1956, the Naval Districts' reporting responsibility shifted to the Chief of Naval Reserve Training Command.

Within the Naval Districts, numerous Naval Reserve training centers provided drill space, instruction, equipment, and administrative support to drilling reservists. These training and administrative support functions were usually provided by a cadre of reservists on indefinite active duty known as TAR's (Training and Administration for Reserves). The commanding officers of the various reserve units normally reported to the reserve center commanding officer (usually a TAR) who in turn reported to the District Deputy Chief of Staff for Reserves. (Mazza, 1992)

### **b. Personnel/Mobilization**

The basic organizational unit of the Naval Reserve evolved from the concept of reserve units initially designated for augmentation to a ship in the event of mobilization. Since it was not always feasible for an entire unit to augment a ship, it was decided to re-organize units as "surface reserve divisions." Although the reserve divisions drilled and trained together, each member of the division had an individual mobilization billet corresponding to the needs of the fleet. (Chaloupka et al., U.S. Naval Reserve History)

The decentralized mobilization assignment policy was the responsibility of the Naval Districts which matched fleet mobilization requirements with qualifications of reservists within their district. (Chaloupka et al., U.S. Naval Reserve History) Each reservist was then provided with individual mobilization orders and a government transportation request which would become valid upon mobilization. If individual mobilization requirements changed, the reservist was simply given a new set of orders to reflect the change in mobilization requirement. The inherent flexibility of this system allowed for a more adaptable system in meeting mobilization requirements. (Mazza, 1992)

### **2. Naval Air Reserve**

The organization of the post-war Naval Air Reserve was distinctly different from that of the Naval Surface Reserve

and transcended Naval District boundaries. (Chaloupka et al., U.S. Naval Reserve History) This was primarily due to the unique nature of aviation which conceptually translated into a more tangible asset.

*a. Organization*

The training and administration of aviation squadrons and units was primarily the responsibility of the commanding officer of the Naval Reserve Air Station or the resident Reserve Air Facility located at an Active Duty Air Station. The reserve squadrons reported to the Reserve Air Station Commanding officer who in turn reported to the Naval Air Reserve Training Command. The Naval Air Reserve Training Command then reported to the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Air) through the Naval Air Training Command.

*b. Personnel/Mobilization*

With the post-World War II surplus in naval aviators, and the rapid transitions to modern aircraft in the regular fleet, it became increasingly difficult for the Naval Air Reserve to maintain a constant squadron/personnel ratio. As a result, some aviation "squadrons" became personnel units which shared the same set of aircraft with other squadrons on different weekends. In the event of mobilization, only one of the squadrons would actually use the aircraft while the other squadrons dispersed to augment like-type active duty squadrons. (Mazza, 1992)

### **C. CONSOLIDATION AT NEW ORLEANS**

With the introduction of the Total Force Policy in 1973, the Naval Reserve began a major reorganization effort. As described by Chaloupka et al. in U.S. Naval Reserve History, the first major change was the consolidation of the air and surface reserve under a newly established Naval Reserve Force. In 1973, the Commander, Naval Reserve Force (CNAVRES) was established and headquartered in New Orleans, Louisiana. CNAVRES was dual-hatted, also serving as the Director of Naval Reserve. Also headquartered at New Orleans under the Commander, Naval Reserve Force were the Commander, Naval Air Reserve Force (COMNAVAIRESFOR), and the Commander, Naval Surface Reserve Force (COMNAVSURFRESFOR).

#### **1. SURFACE RESERVE FORCE**

##### **a. Organization**

In 1976, the administrative control of Surface Reserve training centers shifted from the Naval District Commandants to the newly established Naval Reserve Readiness Commands (REDCOMs), covering geographic regions of the country not necessarily corresponding to those regions covered by the old Naval Districts.

Under this new organizational structure, the REDCOM Commander reported to COMNAVSURFRESFOR. The actual reserve unit commanding officers continued to report to the training

center commanding officers, who now reported to the REDCOM Commander.

**b. Personnel/Mobilization**

In the early 1970's, the Naval Reserve began a major effort to align Naval Reserve units with active force commands. This period of horizontal integration of reserve units with active components was an effort to institutionalize the "one Navy" concept originally envisioned under the Total Force Concept. Naval surface reserve force ships were horizontally integrated into the active fleet for operational control. For non-hardware or augment units, this was the beginning of the gaining command concept presently in place.

Under the gaining command concept, training and mobilization standards were developed and implemented through input received from the active forces. Although not formally institutionalized, direct or mutual support to active commands greatly increased to the point where many essential warfare and support functions are now carried out by the Naval Reserve. (Chaloupka et al., U.S. Naval Reserve History)

**2. AIR RESERVE FORCE**

Under the reorganization of 1973, Naval Air Reserve Training Command at Glenview, Illinois was disestablished and its responsibilities shifted to the newly created Commander, Naval Air Reserve Force in New Orleans.

**a. Organization**

As a practical matter, the consolidation and reorganization of 1973 had less of an effect on the Naval Air Reserve than on the surface reserve because the change in command structure was less obvious. The Naval Air Reserve essentially retained the same command, with most aviation squadrons and augment units continuing to report administratively to the Naval air station commanding officers.

**b. Personnel/Mobilization**

As with the surface reserve, Naval air reserve force squadrons were horizontally integrated into the active force operational aviation forces. The gaining command concept for aviation augment units was also established.

**D. SUMMARY**

The present organizational structure of the Naval Reserve has largely been a function of evolving strategic, political, and budgetary concerns. As with any large organization, the Naval Reserve is not without its critics. Much of the criticism has come from within the Naval Reserve itself and pertains to a wide range of administrative, command, and organizational issues. Ordinarily, incremental change is sufficient to address these issues. Because changes in the strategic, political, and budgetary issues are now revolutionary rather than evolutionary, incremental change may no longer suffice.

#### **IV. RESERVE MANPOWER, MOBILIZATION, AND TRAINING**

Naval Reserve manpower and mobilization requirements are set fourth under the Department of Defense Planning, Programming, and Budgeting System (PPBS), Joint Strategic Capabilities Plan (JSCP), Naval Capabilities Mobilization Plan (NCMP) and OPNAVINST 1001.21 (Naval Reserve Policy and Mission Statement). The presumptive principal guiding these requirements has been the concept of full mobilization for global war. (CINCPACFLT 420, 1992)

##### **A. RESERVE MANPOWER MOBILIZATION REQUIREMENTS**

As described by Kostiuik, the Navy's manpower determinations process can be broken down into three functional areas: (1) requirements determination, (2) billet structuring, and (3) execution.

##### **1. Requirements**

The Navy's active and reserve manpower requirements are both derived under the Navy Manpower Engineering Program (NAVMEP). NAVMEP incorporates the functions of the Ship Manpower Document Program (SMD), the Squadron Manpower Document Program (SQMD), the Shore Manpower Document Program (SHMD), and the Navy Manpower Mobilization System (NAMOS).

Both the SMD and SQMD programs determine their mobilization manpower requirements through an analysis of functional tasks and the manpower needed to perform the minimum of those tasks required in a wartime environment. Reserve augmentation for these active hardware units is the difference between the mobilization requirement and the billets funded, or basic allowance (BA) for active duty personnel during peacetime. Mobilization requirements for shore-based commands are determined by the SHMD program which applies manpower analysis techniques to determine and validate shore manpower requirements.

Two methodologies are used to conduct shore-based manpower analyses under the SHMD program. The first, Shore Required Operational Capability (SHOROC), translates activity orientation to functional categories as defined by responsibilities, assigned duties, and missions and tasks of an organization. Functional categories are then further broken down into specific required functional capabilities which are tasks performed within functional categories. The second is staffing standards, which most often incorporate regression analysis to estimate the relationship between SHOROC identified workloads and required manpower.

The NAMOS system is used to differentiate between peacetime shore-based manpower requirements under the SHMD program and manpower requirements for mobilization. NAMOS uses a complicated time-phased task analysis to calculate



workload changes expected at different intervals of the mobilization process.

The manpower shortfalls identified between the BA for hardware units and increased manpower required at mobilization for shore-based commands are combined and incorporated into the Navy Manpower Data Accounting System (NMDAS). (Kostiuk, 1987)

## **2. Billet structuring**

Using information contained in the NMDAS, billet structuring is the responsibility of the Commander Naval Reserve Force (COMNAVRESFOR). Structured billets are incorporated into the Reserve Unit Manpower Authorization System (RUMAS). Unfortunately, effective billet structuring is no simple task. This is primarily due to the fact that the present system design for the identification of mobilization requirements and billet structuring does not account for disparities between requirements, authorizations, and inventory. Additional complications cited by Kostiuk include:

- Demographic constraints in filling required billets.
- Constraints on augmentation billet requirements for active units necessary to form a corresponding reserve unit.
- Interface difficulties which prevent effective match up between requirements identified in NMDAS and structured billets identified in RUMAS.

Because requirements and actual structured billets reside on incompatible data bases, it is difficult for resource sponsors to properly validate requirements with billet structure. As Kostiuk points out, the consequences of the inability to manage requirements with structured billets are:

- Not all NMDAS identified requirements get structured or authorized.
- The creation of "reserve management" billets to address the realities of reserve unit and personnel administration.
- Creation of training billets in anticipation of requirements result in billet creation unknown to the sponsor.
- NMDAS-RUMAS interface difficulties resulting in inefficient billet structuring and personnel assignment which translates into inefficient mobilization. (Kostiuk, 1987)

### **3. Execution**

In addition to billet structuring, it is also the responsibility of COMNAVRESFOR to recruit, assign, and train qualified individuals to fill identified mobilization billets. The ultimate test of an effective mobilization system is its ability to effectively mobilize when required. Although the recent mobilization of Naval reservists during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm was technically a recall vice mobilization, numerous discrepancies in the Navy's manpower

mobilization process were identified. These problems will be further discussed in Chapter V.

## **B. TRAINING**

The stated mission of the Naval Reserve Force is:

To train and administer the Selected Reserve, including management of all Naval Reserve resources to maintain the highest possible readiness and to perform such other functions as may be directed by the Chief of Naval Operations (CNO). More specifically, OPNAVINST 5430.48C states the mission is; To exercise for CNO, policy, direction, control, administration, and management of the Naval Reserve: to establish plans, programs, priorities, organizations, procedures, and standards for the Naval Reserve; to monitor the status of mobilization readiness of Naval Reserve units and personnel; and to provide budgetary support for Naval Reserve activities and programs. (OP-095, 1991)

Individual mobilization billet training requirements for Naval Reserve augment units are set by the gaining command. There is no prescribed methodology to determine training requirements, but rather the qualified judgement of the gaining command as to what training would be required for an individual to function effectively at mobilization. As extrapolated from the mission statement of the Naval Reserve, "training for mobilization" is one of the primary missions of the Naval Reserve.

### **1. RESERVE HEADQUARTERS SUPPORT**

The primary management tool used to monitor training and readiness in the Naval Reserve is through the Reserve Headquarters Support (RHS), formerly known as Reserve Training

Support System (RTSS). The Director of Naval Reserve (OP-095) describes RHS as:

... the official support and billet structuring and assignment system for use by COMNAVRESFOR in the mobilization of the Selected Reserve. It provides automated readiness information, nationwide mobilization billet exercise reporting, and data exchange of personnel and training data between Reserve and Echelon III/IV commands. (OP-095 Congressional Back-Up Book)

*a. Background.*

Winslow and Seeger's research into the origins and history of the RTSS system provides the following summary. Originally developed under various other names, the RTSS system was an outgrowth of the Aviation Training Support System (ATSS), developed in the early 1970's by Ling Temco Vought (LTV) Corporation. Its primary purpose was to facilitate the training and scheduling of enlisted aircraft maintenance personnel in active duty Navy aircraft squadrons. The goal of the system was to assign required courses, monitor training status, automate, and hopefully reduce, the paperwork associated in the process. In 1977, the Naval Reserve selected ATSS, later renamed RTSS, as the most efficient way to monitor individual selected reserve training and measure reserve unit readiness. In terms of fleet compatibility, pre-existing ADP architecture, and developmental cost, adaptation of ATSS was a logical choice. (Winslow and Seeger, 1985)

As originally envisioned, the stated goals of the RTSS system were as follows:

- An increase in the quantity and quality of SELRES mobilization billet assignments at all command levels.
- Integration of personnel and training record data under a single system accessible from remote locations.
- Reduction of time and training resource requirements through individual SELRES diagnostic testing; individualized instruction; and maintenance and administration of syllabi and courseware.
- Reduction of time required for, and increase in accuracy of, tracking trainee progress.
- Monitoring personnel readiness status.
- Improvement in the effectiveness and efficiency of tracking trainee progress.
- Improvement in the reliability of training information at all command levels.
- Reduction of administrative and clerical workload of field, staff, and operating units.

(CNAVRES, 1981)

***b. Readiness Determination***

Readiness calculations for individual selected reservists and reserve units are calculated in RTSS in accordance with COMNAVRESFORINST 3501.1G. For the individual reservist, readiness is measured by the percentage of training achieved as documented by their training track. This measurement is then entered into RTSS. RTSS generates the reserve unit assignment document (RUAD) which depicts individual readiness by a five letter code. The five letter

code depicts percentage of readiness achieved, qualifications outstanding to achieve 100% readiness, and date the code was last updated.

Overall unit readiness is measured by a combination of Personnel (P) ratings and Training (T) ratings. To compute the "P" rating, the number of personnel assigned to mobilization billets is divided by the number of mobilization billets and multiplied by 100. The "T" rating is generated as the sum of all readiness codes of personnel in mobilization billets divided by the number of personnel in the mobilization billets. The lower of these two percentages is selected as the Overall Readiness (R) rating.

The "P" and "T" ratings range from P1\_\_ 90-100%, P2\_\_ 80-89%, P3\_\_ 55-79%, P4\_\_ 00-54% and T1\_\_ 85-100%, T2\_\_ 70-84%, T3\_\_ 55-69%, and T4\_\_ 00-54% respectively.

The R ratings are defined as follows:

- R1: unit assigned personnel are fully ready for mobilization and integration into the gaining command.
- R2: unit personnel are substantially trained to undertake the bulk of the gaining commands wartime mission.
- R3: unit personnel are training to execute a major portion of the gaining commands wartime mission.
- R4: unit personnel require additional training to meet their mobilization requirements.

As it has evolved, RTSS has been expanded in an ambitious attempt to completely automate the process of

reserve training and administration. Unhappily, as late as 1988 CNAVRES has failed to deliver a workable management information system (MIS) for use in the Naval Reserve. (CINCPACFLT DET 420, 1988)

## **V. ANALYSIS**

Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm and ongoing reorganization initiatives provide an excellent opportunity to test many of the organizational assumptions of the Naval Reserve against the reality of experience. The primary focus of this chapter will be to outline some of the issues pertaining to the Naval Reserve which have arisen as a consequence of the experiences in the Persian Gulf and in conjunction with other changes in the force structure. The opportunity to resolve these issues is recognized as an important factor in the broader context of reserve reorganization and restructuring.

### **A. MANAGEMENT**

In 1988, Naval Reserve CINCPACFLT Detachment 420 (CINCPACFLT DET 420) conducted a management review and organizational analysis of the Naval Reserve. The CINCPACFLT Det 420 Management Assistance Team (MAT) was tasked by the Director of Naval Reserve to conduct this analysis. Although the emphasis was on the Naval Reserve Surface Force and CNAVRES organization as a whole, their analysis addressed issues encountered by the Naval Air Reserve Force as well.

The MAT findings maintained that the administrative and organizational problems facing the Naval Reserve were a result



of the Naval Reserve operating contrary to established Navy principles of leadership, command, chain of command, teamwork, completed staff work, and career incentives. (CINCPACFLT DET 420, 1988)

The MAT found that there was a prevailing failure to comply with CNAVRES policy throughout the Naval Reserve. Equally as serious as this non-compliance was the toleration of willful non-compliance. Organizational disconnects, as well as a lack of standardized command selection criteria, were noted as a contributory factor in the observed widespread lack of leadership.

The lack of organizational vigor in the Naval Reserve was attributed to the double and triple hatting of commanders at various echelons of command.

Numerous violations of the traditional notion of chain of command were noted in which clear lines of authority and responsibility were diffused through a myriad of "stove pipe" commands within the Naval Reserve. The lack of standardization of command authority and responsibility was contrary to established Navy policy and tradition.

Fragmentation and rivalries between different segments of the Naval Reserve has led to a breakdown of the traditional concept of teamwork. This fragmentation has led to localized politicalization of various reserve commands in which policies and directives are promulgated that are not necessarily consistent with the mission of the Naval Reserve.

The MAT also noted a consistent lack of completed staff work among the various levels of the Naval Reserve. Although the MAT could not pin down the exact cause, it was speculated that poor morale could be the cause of poor staffwork or that poor staffwork could be a factor in poor morale. Poor staffwork prior to the establishment of significant changes in reserve policy or command authority has, in the past, led to unnecessary administrative duplication, and prolonged confusion over lines of legitimate command authority and responsibility.

The MAT found that there were no criteria for selection of qualified surface TARs in key reserve management positions. Many positions on the CNAVRES and COMNAVSURFRESFOR staffs were occupied by individuals with no field management experience. Conversely, many in key field positions had no experience at CNAVRES or COMNAVSURFRESFOR. The lack of an institutionalized career path and reward system was cited as a deficiency in the proper career development in the surface TAR community.

## **B. ORGANIZATION**

The MAT further maintained that the structure of the Naval Reserve force organization was in serious need of overhaul if the identified management problems were to be rectified. The MAT identified five major issues pertaining to the organizational inefficiencies at CNAVRES. These issues included inconsistency with mission, organizational

disconnects, job definitions, and control of own destiny. The following excerpts from chapter four of the MAT report highlight these issues:

1. Inconsistency with Mission. Current COMNAVRESFOR and COMNAVSURFRESFOR organizations are not consistent with the Naval Reserve mission--i.e., to provide trained units and qualified individuals upon mobilization.

- COMNAVRESFOR does not have training or readiness functions; readiness and training functions [are] assigned at Echelon 3 level while [the] planning function [is] assigned at Echelon 2 level.
- COMNAVSURFRESFOR's training functions [are] organized by programs and training-related tasks, such as training systems, without any director assigned for readiness or planning for the Naval Surface Reserve Force. Program officers tend to be narrowly focused and over- or under-manage all aspects of the programs assigned including details of units ACDUTRA [Active Duty for training] and IDTT [weekend away for training]. Program officers are not managing training or readiness; instead they often become immersed in the day-to-day details of the units within programs.

2. Organizational Disconnects. Current COMNAVRESFOR organization does not line up with OP-095 and Echelon 4 organizations which leads to organizational disconnects and violations of the chain of command.

- COMNAVRESFOR does not have surface or air functions to mate up with OP-095 surface and air divisions which leads to direct communication between Echelons 1 and 3. COMNAVRESFOR as ISIC [immediate senior in charge] for COMNAVSURFRESFOR and COMNAVAIRESFOR is cut out of chain of command.
- COMNAVSURFRESFOR and COMNAVAIRESFOR do not have manpower, financial, MIS/ADP, and facilities functions to mate up with REDCOMS and other Echelons 4 commands. This leads to direct communication between Echelons 2 and 4. COMNAVSURFRESFOR as ISIC for REDCOMS is cut out of chain of command.

- COMNAVSURFRESFOR uses program officers which no longer are included in REDCOM or REDCEN/RESCEN organizations. This leads to direct communication between Echelon 3 and units.

3. Unclear Job Definition. Current COMNAVRESFOR organization manual does not define functions and jobs clearly.

- Staff Regulations have fuzzy definitions for majority of jobs and use inactive and unclear terms such as "monitor" and "coordinate" to describe jobs.
- In some instances, the regulations define a job as "assisting" DCOS and then list tasks of DCOS plus one or two additional tasks. The additional tasks thus are the only separation between assistants whose other tasks necessarily overlap. Thus, poor definition blurs lines of demarcation between assistants and complicates the entry for communications between echelons. To the extent that the additional activities are not included in the DCOS's functions, the regulations imply that assistants perform functions over which a superior has no supervision.

4. Control of Own Destiny. Most COMNAVSURFRESFOR and COMNAVAIRESFOR staff personnel want their own manpower and finance functions. Both desire to plan and program people and money independent of each other. This would allow competition for people and money at OP-095; some directors at COMNAVSURFRESFOR believe that the present organization prevents such competition because manpower and planning functions are performed by COMNAVRESFOR, not by COMNAVSURFRESFOR.

COMNAVSURFRESFOR believes that it has been short-suited in people and money for its programs. COMNAVAIRESFOR's people oppose any organization by which the problems of COMNAVSURFRESFOR may affect their training and readiness. COMNAVSURFRESFOR believes that it has been denied the opportunity to compete with COMNAVAIRESFOR on the merits and to perform to the fullest. This is contradicted by COMNAVSURFRESFOR's rejecting opportunities to own its own assets, e.g., rejection of NRF ships and agreement to shift MIUW's [mobile in-shore warfare units] to TYCOMS [type commanders]. (CINCPACFLT DET 420, 1988)

### C. ADP INFRASTRUCTURE

The all encompassing nature of Reserve Headquarters Support (RHS) in attempting to automate the process of training and administration of the Naval Reserve has not been without difficulty. The process of mobilization for Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm highlighted problems in the Naval Reserve ADP infrastructure. Weaknesses in the RHS system are a direct function of the underlying system structure. RHS is only part of a larger, redundant, outdated, and poorly designed ADP infrastructure in the Naval Reserve. With the ultimate failure to eliminate duplication within the infrastructure, RHS has not functioned as originally envisioned. This is primarily due to the fact that the system is dependent on information input derived from other data bases outside the control of the RHS users.

RHS is largely dependent on data already provided on hardcopy documents and available to local users. Unit inputs are usually done on a monthly basis at the local drill site. The existing data bases that have an input into the RHS system are IMAPMIS (Inactive Manpower and Personnel Management Information System) and NMDAS. RHS is extremely sensitive to these two data bases. A mistake, omission, or change in these data bases can render subsequent inputs into RHS useless, with the added difficulty of the user having no knowledge or control over the management of these other data bases.

For example, IMAPMIS inputs identify the member's existence in the Naval Reserve. This data is input by the local personnel office with no direct line of responsibility to local reserve commands. Accordingly, if the person's accession, loss, or status in the Naval Reserve is not properly entered into IMAPMIS or entered in a timely manner, the member is not recognized as existing in RHS. It is not uncommon for six months to a year to pass before a reserve gain or loss is properly recognized in IMAPMIS. Since IMAPMIS and RHS files are reconciled on a regular basis with IMAPMIS overriding RHS, the resulting inaccurate reports generated by RHS contribute to the low degree of accuracy RHS has as a useful measure of readiness.

Additionally, NMDAS inputs into RHS have from time to time been erratic, resulting in RHS outputs in which the entire billet structure has been changed, deleted, doubled or otherwise manipulated, making reasonable month to month calculations of readiness a function of phone conversation consensus rather than objective quantitative measurement.

In the Naval Reserve, all policy formulation has centered around readiness, the primary mission of the Naval Reserve. In that regard, "official" readiness has been readiness as measured by RHS. As the standard of readiness measurement, RHS must be backed up with manual documentation for purposes of accurate readiness reporting.

Illustrative of the system's ultimate failure is the continued inability of CNAVRES to accurately account for unit readiness through RHS. Readiness is frequently determined by informal phone contact between resident program managers at CNAVRES and their program managers in the field to verify or get an update on the readiness data generated at CNAVRES by RHS. This practice has raised serious doubts as to the credibility of RHS as an effective management tool. In the field, the reserve units find themselves spending valuable time in the documentation and input of RHS data that might otherwise be spent on training.

#### **D. MOBILIZATION**

As described by Chaloupka et al., the Reserve mobilization process for Operation Desert Storm/Desert Shield was the first use of reserve forces under the presidential statutory authority granted under Title 10 USC 673b. As distinguished from other statutes which require a state of war or national emergency as a prerequisite for reserve activation, Section 673b grants presidential authority for the use of up to 200,000 SELRES for operational requirements. Originally passed in 1976 and later amended in 1980 and 1986, the original intent of Section 673b was to invigorate the credibility of reserve participation under the Total Force Policy. The statute specifically sought to:

promote reliance on the Reserve and U.S. military capability...give the President greater flexibility in foreign policy...and improve U.S. response capability and international stability. (U.S. Senate, 1975)

The 1980 amendment to Section 673b increased the manpower authorization from 50,000 to 100,000. The 1986 amendment raised the manpower ceilings to 200,000 and doubled the initial 90 day period to 180 days.

As further discussed by Chaloupka et al., prior to Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, issues concerning the possible exercise of recall authority under 10 USC 673b were raised during Global War Game (GWG) 89 conducted at the Naval War College and the JCS Command Post Exercise (CPX) PROUD EAGLE 90. Some of these issues proved to be prophetic when compared to the experience of the actual call- up of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm.

The significant issues raised in GWG 89 involved misunderstandings and interpretations of terminology. The first issue concerned the use of the word mobilization rather than "Active force augmentation" or "Presidential recall" as authorized under 673b. The use of the word "mobilization" has both legal and historical implications which may not be appropriate in certain circumstances. Concern was also expressed that the subtleties of 673b and its significant implications of a recall vs mobilization were not well understood by civilian and military leaders. As experience



later proved, the Naval Reserve has no standardized administrative procedures to deal with a recall on the scale of Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm.

Another issue raised during GWG 89 was that the 200,000 recall authority was a rigid numerical requirement rather than a ceiling under which various force-mix combinations could be tailored to meet the given requirements.

An issue raised as a result of CPX PROUD EAGLE 90 was that there were significant administrative planning and oversight problems that might hinder timely SELRES activation. It was also observed that there was a reliance on "base case" reserve call-up scenarios rather than tailored, less than global war type call-ups. Additionally, some units that are critical for "front end" augmentation of major staffs were not cited as sources of manpower in the CINC OPLANS. (Chaloupka et al., 1990)

The call-up of Naval Reservists during Operation Desert Storm/Desert Shield was characterized by some of the difficulties suggested by the exercise experiences. The primary difficulty was that reserve augment unit organization was based on the assumption of unit rather than individual recall.

During Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, manpower recall procedures were based on a quick build up to full mobilization vs recall. As a result, there existed at CNAVRES, the gaining commands, and within the units, no

prioritization of critical individuals or billets to be filled short of full mobilization.

Ad-hoc procedures had to be developed to identify billets and individuals to mobilize. In some cases, specific communities chose to limit reserve participation to volunteers only, thereby denying some gaining commands access to the entire pool of qualified reservists and putting into question the concept of "involuntary recall." An already weak ADP system (RHS) and incompatibility between reserve and active duty ADP systems further complicated the process of identification of individuals with billets.

#### **E. MANPOWER**

For the short term, manpower will not be a problem in the reserves since the current downsizing will create a pool, unprecedented in size, of qualified individuals available for reserve affiliation. In addition, Congress will inevitably agree to some cut in the size of the reserve force.

Long term manpower implications are more ominous since the current drawdown methodologies suggested by Congress are characterized more by explicit short term political concerns rather than objective analysis.

When considering the future manpower requirements for the reserves, public perceptions of the process by which the current drawdown will be implemented will also be an issue. As suggested by CJCS Gen. Powell in testimony to the Senate

Armed Services Committee, the familial and generational traditions of military service could be upset by a perception of a "political feeding frenzy" in Congress over the military budget. The resultant perception of a "breach of faith" by the career active force could serve as an impediment to future reconstitution of the active force if necessary. (POWELL, 1992)

Over time, the historical argument that "reserves are cheaper than active forces" will also become less significant. Since the present reserve force is composed primarily of former active duty members, a shrinking active force will diminish as a source for trained reserve manpower. Consequently, the costs of maintaining reserves will go up over time as the costs of training a gradually decreasing pool of increasingly unqualified reservists are absorbed by the reserves.

#### **F. TRAINING**

The primary challenge in carrying out training in the Naval Reserve has been in the area of training standardization and readiness accounting. Tremendous strides have been made in recent years with the evolution of individual billet training requirements as created by the gaining commands. As a practical matter, many of these requirements have been kept sufficiently broad to facilitate the realities of training across a broad spectrum of local environments.

Since the Naval Reserve is in the business of training with "readiness" as its ultimate product, there has evolved a narrow focus on mobilization training at the expense of contributory support. As the roles of reserves are expanded, new measurement criteria must be developed. (Naval War College, 1992)

Beyond the context of the changed strategic and fiscal circumstances, the Naval Reserve faces numerous organizational and management challenges in the areas of managerial effectiveness, organizational continuity, management information systems, mobilization procedures, manpower planning, and training documentation. Given the changed strategic and fiscal circumstances facing the leadership of the reserves, there exists both the imperative and the opportunity to meet these challenges.

A new reserve model based on the Innovative Naval Reserve Concept recommends a dramatic shift from the traditional missions and roles of the Naval Reserve and suggests the opportunity to streamline the Naval Reserve organization.

## **VI. THE INNOVATIVE NAVAL RESERVE**

### **A. BACKGROUND**

The most comprehensive Naval Reserve realignment plan put forth to date is the "Innovative Naval Reserve Concept" (INRC) as outlined in Naval Reserve 2000: Flexible Force for the Future. (Chaloupka et al., 1991) Incorporating the concepts and assumptions of the New National Military Strategy, the INRC makes recommendations for changes in Naval Reserve mission areas, structure, readiness and training, and administration. As amplified and further articulated in subsequent Department of the Navy documents, the INRC has so far served as a blueprint for the ongoing realignment of the Naval Reserve force mission and organization.

### **B. STRATEGIC/FISCAL ASSUMPTIONS**

The strategic and fiscal assumptions that are the foundations of INRC parallel those of the New National Military Strategy. These assumptions include a reduced threat of a quick global war, continued or increased regional threats with possible U.S. involvement, and the reality of declining defense budgets while maintaining the requirement to remain engaged in world affairs. Because these assumptions are so fundamentally different from the Cold War focus of the last

forty five years, there exists a requirement for a change in reserve mission areas.

The consequences of such changes include the elimination of mobilization training as the primary function of the Naval Reserve, the creation of reserve forces readily accessible to meet CINC requirements, and increased reserve contributory support to maintain operational requirements with a reduced active force. Chaloupka et al. provide the following conceptual summary of the INRC.

#### **C. CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK**

The conceptual framework of the INRC involves a combination of Total Force participation of the Naval Reserve under the NNMS, Total Quality Leadership (TQL) techniques, and lessons learned from Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm. To realize the full potential of the reserve element of the Total Force Concept, the mission areas of the Naval Reserve should mirror the strategic deterrence, forward presence, crisis response and reconstitution "pillars" of the NNMS.

To implement these new roles for the Naval Reserve, it will be necessary to change administrative practices in the Naval Reserve. Specifically, the CNO has mandated implementation of TQL into a decentralized reserve structure to effect added accountability, removal of administrative barriers, and increased responsiveness to the customers (CINCS).

Lessons learned from Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm provide a mandate for a reserve force configured to meet CINC requirements, to smoothly carry out a tailored recall, and to effectively utilize unique skills possessed by individual reservists.

#### **D. INNOVATIVE NAVAL RESERVE CONCEPTS**

The concepts of the INRC outlined by Chaloupka et al. are contained in the specific categories of mission areas, structure, readiness and training, and administration.

##### **1. MISSION AREAS**

Under the broad assumption that the use of reserve forces is cheaper than active forces, the INRC advocates increased reserve participation in the areas of contributory support and contingency response. The object of increased contributory support is to provide maximum contributory support to the GCs and other Naval activities. The emphasis is on the required peacetime missions of medical, airlift, maritime patrol, intelligence, and public affairs. The primary benefit of increased contributory support is to provide OPTEMPO/PERSTEMPO relief for the active forces, direct and flexible response to GC requirements as well as maximization of training opportunities.

Utilizing the lessons learned in Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm, the INRC recommends the creation of a reserve contingency response of approximately 20,000

reservists for small regional crises or as a nucleus for a larger regional crisis. The missions of the contingency force would mirror the cargo handling, sealift, port security, medical, airlift, combat search and rescue, logistics and construction functions so effectively provided by Naval Reservists during Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm.

## **2. STRUCTURE**

To build a more responsive reserve organizational structure, a decentralized customer driven organization is necessary to facilitate a reserve organization aligned with CINC/GC requirements. Decentralization would require a transfer of some reserve administrative functions to the CINCs and GCs through the transfer of existing reserve administrative assets, primarily manpower and funds. Reserve mission validation as a function of CINC/CG OPPLANS and requirements would allow a customer driven approach to reserve utilization. This would also allow the creation of Contingency Reserve Forces for tailored recalls and incorporation of those tailored recalls into CINC/CG OPPLANS.

Integration of the active and reserve forces mandated under Total Force could be facilitated by elimination of duplicate operational, training and support structures, transfer of reserve resource sponsorship from the Naval Reserve to the CINC/CGs, and integration of active and reserve manpower data manpower databases. Accountability would be



strengthened by a transfer of responsibility for readiness criteria, training and support to the CINCs/CGs.

### **3. READINESS AND TRAINING**

Under the INRC, readiness and training criteria would continue to be set by the CINCs/GCs, who would also assume responsibility for readiness training. Crisis response capabilities would be enhanced by specialized training for crisis-related missions, maintenance of war-fighting skills, and emphasis on joint training missions. Enhancement of contributory support missions would be facilitated through training for non-traditional missions, performance based training, cross-training, maximization of civilian skills, movement of reserve billets closer to active duty commands, and enlistment of veterans to support their previous active duty commands.

The key to such radical changes in traditional training concepts is the introduction of flexibility to the unnecessarily rigid drill and active duty requirements presently in place. Increased flexibility in readiness and training would provide for surge capability during crisis, corporate memory for GCs, and relief for CGs during peak periods.

### **4. ADMINISTRATION**

The effective implementation of the INRC would require administrative changes designed to remove barriers to

effective reserve utilization. Specifically, the INRC recommends the transfer of order writing authority from COMNAVRESFOR to the gaining commands, reasonable allowances for flexible reserve drill, and active duty for training based on customer driven requirements vice narrowly interpreted statutory dictates. Equally important and so far missing from the present reserve organization is the requirement for implementation of effective management information systems to provide CINCs/CGs/BUPERS with on-line access incorporating the maintenance of a civilian skill inventory. Streamlining the organization would require the transfer of reserve administrative support to USN activities, decentralization of administrative processing to meet the needs of the CINCs/CGs, and increased reserve coordination with OPNAV/BUPERS. (Chaloupka et al., 1991)

#### **E. PROGRESS TO DATE**

The Department of the Navy is already transitioning to many of the concepts put forth in the INRC. Chief of Naval Operations (CNO) approval for a new model for the structure and employment of Naval Reserve forces was announced on January 23, 1992. (CNO, February 1992) The Secretary of the Navy (SECNAV), in his Program Objectives Memorandum (POM) guidance for fiscal year 1994, summarizes the Navy's new strategy with regard to the Reserves as follows:

Reserve Programs. The role of the Naval Reserve must change in recognition of the new security requirements. Historically, the focus on the Naval Reserve has centered on training for global war. Now, the focus must shift to preparation for crisis response and support of the fleet in peacetime through contributory support. (SECNAV, 1992)

The SECNAV guidance further specifies that planners:

- Consider transfer of CONUS-based fleet support missions to the reserves.
- Substitute reserve billets for active billets wherever continuous coverage is not required, to the extent feasible.
- Shift reserve billets between programs to provide increased contributory support and/or improved crisis response.
- Tailor the readiness of reserve organizations to provide increased flexibility in employment.
- Consider reducing the reserve manning of active ship augmentation units (other than tender augmentation units) from the level required to support full wartime operations (M+1) to that needed to support programmed billets authorized (BA). Further consider the establishment, on each coast, of generic augmentation units for appropriate classes of ships. (SECNAV, 1992)

As directed by the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, a complete review of selected reserve billet requirements by Navy resource sponsors in coordination with all 36 manpower claimants is currently underway. (CNO, June 1992) OP-06 guidelines for the review define the concepts of flexible readiness, crisis response, contributory support and review guidance instructions. Recommendations from the reserve

billet review are scheduled to be briefed to the CNO in December 1992.

The plan of action and milestones for the billet review provided by OP-06 is summarized as follows:

- May 92, OP-60, 01, 095  
Establish guidelines for reporting of Selres functional requirements.
- JUN 92, OP-60  
Brief manpower claimants and resource sponsors on review guidelines.
- JUL-AUG 92, OP-06  
Meet with manpower claimants.
- JUN-SEPT 92, Manpower claimants  
Review selres functional requirements.
- OCT 92, OP-06, 01, 095, Resource sponsors  
Review manpower claimants inputs of Selres functional requirements.
- NOV 92, OP-60 Total Force preview to PDRC
  1. Recommend changes for Selres distributions and reductions
  2. Recommend new criteria for reserve validation
  3. Make recommendations on structuring reserve functions into crisis response/contributory support
- DEC 92, OP-60  
Brief CNO decision meeting. (CNO, June 1992)

The INRC represents the first major restructuring of the Naval Reserve since the consolidation of the 1970s. Current fiscal realities, as well as changes in the strategic threat, mandate a more efficient utilization of the Naval Reserve. The INRC model argues that efficient utilization can best be achieved through increased contributory support to the active

forces rather than mobilization training for the increasingly remote possibility of global war.

The implementation process of some of the recommendations made under the INRC model has yet to address the implicit organizational changes necessary to effect such changes. Incorporation of TQL concepts of organizational management recommended by the INRC implies a change to a smaller, decentralized Naval Reserve as an integral component of the active GCs, allowing reserve units to be more responsive to the "needs of the customer." Additionally, the INRC recommends that new training and readiness standards must be developed to reflect the new roles and missions of the Naval Reserve.

These issues as well as recommendations incorporated from the MAT report will be discussed and summarized in the final chapter.

## **VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

### **A. CONCLUSIONS**

The changed world order and present downsizing of the active forces necessitate a restructuring of the missions of the reserve forces. Greater dependency on reserve forces is consistent with the national tradition of "citizen soldier," especially during a time of decreased strategic threat. Despite DOD recommendations to the contrary, it is not likely that Congress will consider large cuts in the reserve force in the foreseeable future.

To effectively implement Total Force and the New National Military Strategy concepts of reserve integration and support for the active force, the Naval Reserve must change its emphasis and performance criteria from "mobilization training" to contributory support and contingency response.

The organizational difficulties identified in the MAT report, the lessons learned from Operation Desert Shield/Desert Storm as well as the recommendations adopted from the Innovative Naval Reserve concept all serve as drivers for structural change within the Naval Reserve.

### **B. RECOMMENDATIONS**

Drawing from the aforementioned analysis, the following broad recommendations are made in the areas of management,

organization, ADP infrastructure, mobilization, manpower, and training.

#### **1. MANAGEMENT**

The implications of greater integration with gaining commands are that the present reserve administrative "management structure" (both SELRES and TAR) must be re-validated. The present regulations governing reserve drill and active duty for training should be revised to facilitate increased flexibility and responsiveness to gaining command requirements. It is recommended that all reserve managers possess individual leadership skills and demonstrated managerial experience to meet the leadership and management challenges identified in the MAT. To facilitate those goals, realistic career incentives, formalized screening, and standards of performance should be established.

#### **2. ORGANIZATION**

As recommended by the MAT, the unified COMNAVRESFOR structure in New Orleans should be eliminated. In its place, separate air and surface reserve commands should be maintained in New Orleans, with both commands reporting directly to the Director of Naval Reserve (OP-095) in Washington, D.C. These new stand-alone organizations would only share administrative support resources. The staffs and organizational structure of the separate air and surface reserve commands should mirror the functional staffs of their active duty counterparts and

resource sponsors. All Naval Reserve organizations, down to and including the individual augment units, should be organized to eliminate duplicate command and administrative functions. These changes would be consistent with the objectives of decentralization implied in the INRC.

### **3. ADP INFRASTRUCTURE**

A complete re-engineering of the reserve ADP structure is needed to develop a management information system geared to the needs of the user. The management information system should maximize the use of prevailing technology, allowing for increased integration with active duty management information systems.

### **4. MOBILIZATION**

Recall procedures should be developed and exercised to reflect realistic use of reserve manpower short of full mobilization. Once qualified in a particular mobilization billet, individual reservists should be retained in that billet indefinitely, if possible.

### **5. MANPOWER**

Proposals for the movement of reserve billets to both coasts should be examined thoroughly with the understanding that population size and growth rates alone do not necessarily translate into readily identifiable regions of available manpower. Demographic and econometric studies should be conducted to predict the quantity and quality of available



manpower for both the long and short term. Results from these studies should be used to identify both the numbers and locations of reserve billets.

#### **6. TRAINING**

Accountability for reserve readiness should be transferred to the gaining commands. A need exists to develop a methodology to translate active duty contributory support into a quantifiable measurement of readiness.

The actual modifications in reserve force structure will be contingent on the manpower and funding levels approved by Congress. It remains to be seen what recommendations (if any) Congress chooses to adopt from Rand's Active Reserve Mix Study due to be released in December 1992.

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